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Abstract
In this Essay, written for the Fifty Years of European Union (“EU”) Law Conference organized
by Fordham Law School, I intend to sketch the independent position of the European Central
Bank (“ECB”) in the context of economic policy making within the European Union. I will briefly
describe the law and the practice in respect of independence and economic-policy making, both
the internal (domestic policies) and the external aspects (international policies). The law is stated
as of February 25, 2008.
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INTRODUCTION*
In this Essay, written for the Fifty Years of European Union
("EU") Law Conference organized by Fordham Law School, I
intend to sketch the independent position of the European Cen-
tral Bank ("ECB") in the context of economic policy making
within the European Union. I will briefly describe the law and
the practice in respect of independence and economic-policy
making, both the internal (domestic policies) and the external
aspects (international policies). The law is stated as of February
25, 2008.
I. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY
AND ECONOMIC POLICIES
A. A Single Monetary Policy
The Treaty establishing the European Community, i.e., the
EEC Treaty,' as amended, notably by the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992 ("EC Treaty"), provides that there is a single monetary pol-
icy for the EU whereas economic policies are the competence of
the individual Member States.2 Of course, those Member States
which have not yet adopted the single currency maintain their
(or rather, their central bank's) own monetary policies,3 which
are to be coordinated with that of the ECB in the General Coun-
cil of the ECB.4 Until the complete monetary unification of Eu-
rope, the federal competence for monetary policy only extends
* Jean Monnet Professor, Law of the Economic and Monetary Union, Universiteit
van Amsterdam (University of Amsterdam).
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 105(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also Protocol on
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
art. 3.1, O.J. C 310/225, at 226 (2004) [hereinafter ECB Statute].
3. See ECB Statute, supra note 2, art. 43.2, O.J. C 310/225, at 243.
4. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 117(2) & 124(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 94, 101;
see also ECB Statute, supra note 2, arts. 44-47, O.J. C 310/225, at 244-45.
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to the Eurozone.5
This means that monetary policy, with the overarching ob-
jective of price stability (and a secondary objective of "sup-
port[ing] the general economic policies in the Community with
a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the
Community as laid down in Article 2 [of the Treaty]"), 6 is con-
ducted centrally for the entire Union (Eurozone). The Euro-
pean System of Central Banks ("ESCB") is entrusted with defin-
ing and implementing monetary policy.7 The institutions8 also
play their part but only in auxiliary roles. Notably, the Council
of Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance ("Ecofin Coun-
cil"), is competent to lay down the framework for certain activi-
ties of the ESCB.9 Both the Council President and a member of
the Commission are authorized to be present during delibera-
tions of the ECB's Governing Council and, thus, are present
when decisions on monetary policy are taken."0 Both also have a
role to play in the external or exchange-rate policy for the euro.
Yet, even in this area, the ESCB has a pivotal role, to be exer-
cised in full independence, as will be explained in Part V below.
5. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 122(3)-(5), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 99-100.
6. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87 for a mandate
that the European System of Central Banks ("ESCB") is to act "in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allo-
cation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4 [of the
EC Treaty]." See also ECB Statute, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. C 310/225, at 225 (utilizing
similar language). These principles include "stable prices, sound public finances ...
and a sustainable balance of payments." Id. art. 4(3), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 46.
7. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87; see also ECB
Statute, supra note 2, art. 3.1, O.J. C 310/225, at 226. The Treaty of Lisbon ("Reform
Treaty"), which is scheduled to enter into force on January 1, 2009, will rename the EC
Treaty as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). Draft Treaty
of Lisbon (Reform Treaty) art. 2(1), O.J. C 306/01, at 42 (2007), opened for signature
Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Reform Treaty].
8. Upon ratification of the Reform Treaty, I should say "other institutions.., as
the ECB is to become an institution. See Reform Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 108, 114-15,
O.J. C 306/01, at 59-60 (if the Reform Treaty is ratified, EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts.
108, 114-15, O.J. C 321 E/37 at 88, 91-93 will become arts. 130 and 134-35, respectively,
in the TFEU. For extensive discussions of the ECB's constitutional status, see generally
Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The Constitutional Status of the European Central Bank, 44
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 355 (2007); Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, Recent Developments
in the Law of the European Central Bank, 25 Y.B. EuR. L. 1 (2006).
9. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
10. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 113(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 91; see also Reform
Treaty, supra note 6, art. 251, art. 294, at 126-28. O.J. C 306/01 at 115-17 (if the Reform
Treaty is ratified, will become Art. 294 of the TFEU).
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B. Coordination of Economic Policies
Economic policy, on the other hand, has remained
predominantly a national competence. Within a European con-
text, that means that the States are the primary actors and have
remained largely sovereign in this area. Their freedom has been
circumscribed by certain rules.
The prohibition of monetary financing and of privileged ac-
cess for public bodies to financial institutions aside, the prohibi-
tion of excessive budget deficits ranks paramount among these
rules. Whereas the former rules, laid down in EC Treaty Articles
100 and 101," are maintained according to the usual system
with the European Commission in its guardian role, a different
procedure has been laid down for the prohibition of excessive
deficits in EC Treaty Article 104.12 Here, the Commission and
the Ecofin Council play the leading role, with the European
Court ofJustice ("ECJ") being specifically excluded from finding
whether an excessive budget deficit exists.' 3 This is a political
decision, to be made amongst peers in the Ecofin Council. 14
Even though the process may result in the imposition of formal
sanctions against a deviant State, notably the imposition of a fine
or a non-interest-bearing deposit, the more likely outcome is a
recommendation to rectify the deficit or a formal notice for the
State to put its fiscal house in order. The Treaty provision has
been elaborated in a set of documents known as the Stability and
Growth Pact ("SGP"). 5 These contain details of the process of
11. EC Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 100-01, O.J. C 321 E/01, at 83-84 is unchanged by
the Reform Treaty. If the Reform Treaty is ratified, these Articles will become Articles
122-23 of the TFEU.
12. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 104, O.J. C 321 E/01, at 84-86. This remains un-
changed by the Reform Treaty. If it is ratified, EC Article 104 will become Article 126 of
the TFEU.
13. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 104(10), O.J. C 321 E/01, at 85. This remains
unchanged by the Reform Treaty. If it is ratified, EC Article 104(10) will become Arti-
cle 126(10) of the TFEU.
14. See Mathieu Segers & Femke van Esch, Behind the Veil of Budgetary Discipline: The
Political Logic of the Budgetary Rules in EMU and the SGP, 45J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1089,
1105 (2007).
15. See Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. L 209/1 (1997), amended by Council
Regulation No. 1055/2005, O.J. L 174/1 (2005) (on the Strengthening of the Surveil-
lance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Poli-
cies); Council Regulation No. 1467/97 O.J. L 209/6 (1997), amended by Council Regula-
tion No. 1056/2005, O.J. L 174/5 (2005)(on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Imple-
mentation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure).
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overseeing budgetary discipline. They fill in some of the discre-
tion that EC Treaty Article 104 leaves. I should add that the ECJ
does have a role in overseeing whether EC Treaty Article 104 is
being upheld in the political process of overseeing compliance
with the prohibition of excessive deficits, a role which it wisely
played when called upon to decide whether the Council's lack of
enforcement with respect to Germany and France in 2003 was
within the law.16
Apart from the rules just described, economic policy is the
subject of an extended coordination mechanism, laid down in
EC Treaty Articles 98 and 99.17 Here, again, coordination is or-
ganized among peers with, at the most, a recommendation being
issued to a Member State which does not follow Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines ("BEPGs") adopted by the Ecofin Council.
The picture, thus, is one of some rules and principles and several
procedures but hardly any binding decision-making. There is
the option to adopt Community measures of economic policy
(EC Treaty Article 100). This is hardly used as States are jeal-
ously guarding their prerogatives.
The external policies with respect to the euro relate to the
exchange-rate competences, which will be discussed in more de-
tail in Part II below.
C. Resulting Framework
It follows that the ESCB operates in an environment in
which it is the main policymaker for an important element of the
economy, i.e., the stability of the currency in terms of domestic
purchasing power, with other elements influenced by a variety of
actors. In other jurisdictions, central banks are likewise faced
with a variety of other players influencing economic outcome
but, in Europe, the public actor pursuing economic policies is a
pluralistic one, divided among twenty-seven Member States with,
in some of these, regional authorities playing an important eco-
nomic policy role. Thus, the ESCB faces a variety of public ac-
tors, bound to coordinate their policies but-as we will see-
reluctant to do so fully. Although this state of affairs bodes well
for the independence of the ESCB, with the other side of the
16. See generally Commission v. Council, Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649.
17. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 98-99, 0J. C 321 E/37 at 82-83. If the Reform
Treaty is ratified, EC Treaty Articles 98 and 99 will become Articles 120-21 of the TFEU.
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dialogue on the appropriate monetary policy/economic policy
mix so dispersed and divided, it does not facilitate economic pol-
icy/monetary policy coordination, even with intricate arrange-
ments in place on paper.
D. Constitution and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union: No Fundamental Change
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ("Euro-
pean Constitution") of 2004 would have maintained the same
division of competences on monetary and economic policies be-
tween the federation and the States. Likewise, the Treaty of Lis-
bon (2007) does not amend European Monetary Union
("EMU") law basically. Thus, the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union ("TFEU"), as the EC Treaty is to be called
after ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, by and large maintains
the state of affairs described, albeit framed in differently num-
bered provisions.
II. ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION: PRACTICE
A. Internally
Without going into details, the practical application of the
Treaty provisions on economic policy leaves much to be desired.
The lofty wording of EC Treaty Article 98, according to which
"Member States shall conduct their economic policies with a
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the
Community ... and in the context of [Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines], '18 hardly translates visibly in day-to-day practice.
Economic policies are framed within a national context, with na-
tional political exigencies predominant. When these policies are
aligned, this is sometimes more a matter of coincidence or of the
likeness of the economic debate across borders than the result of
purposeful action. Especially, the prohibition of excessive
budget deficits and the SGP are not popular with national politi-
cians, to say the least. The full potential of the economic policy
provisions adopted in Maastricht has yet to be realized. What we
do see is an increased awareness of these provisions and real
18. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 98, O.J. C. 321 E/37, at 82; see also Reform
Treaty, supra note 7, art. 115a, O.J. C 306/01 at 75 (Eurozone-specific guidelines which
may be adopted and strengthened surveillance which may be applied). If the Reform
Treaty is ratified, this will become Art. 120 of the TFEU.
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peer group pressure to abide by them. But, when it comes to
enforcing compliance, the mechanisms are too weak, and politi-
cians too much concerned with short-termism and populism, for
the rules to be followed.
Even more worrying is the tendency of some of the Member
States to coordinate on a bilateral or trilateral basis, or as a four-
some. Recently, the four larger Member States came together to
discuss the effects of the credit crunch that followed last sum-
mer's U.S. sub-prime crisis, which started to spill over into a
global slowing of economic growth. 9 Even if some coordination
is better than no coordination, the fact that some Member States
think that they can speak for the whole without inviting all or
without operating through the channels that the Treaty frame-
work provides, is a worrying sign. It gives the impression that the
political actors are somewhat indifferent to the rule of law and to
the totality of the club to which they belong.
B. Externally
A similar picture shows on the external side of economic
policies, i.e., coordination with third countries and within inter-
national organizations. Member States are still used to con-
ducting their own external commercial policies even though
there is one Customs Code with the same tariffs and quota for
the entire EU: they engage in trade missions, fostering eco-
nomic cooperation with third countries as if there is no external
tariff or common commercial policy. Similarly, States engage ex-
ternally without full regard to their Community membership or
obligations in the area of the EMU. The United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and Germany take part in the Group of Eight in-
dustrialized nations meetings in which the President of the Euro-
pean Commission and the President of the ECB take part as well,
largely unnoticed by the media or by their non-European coun-
19. See Four Major EU States to Discuss Global Economy, EUOBSERVER.COM, Jan. 15,
2008, http://euobserver.com/9/25454 (noting that "the invitee list is notable for in-
cluding only the major EU economic players, leaving out the 23 other member states as
well as any representative of the European Commission."). The London "credit crunch
summit" was held on January 29, 2008. European Commission President Jos6 Manuel
Barroso warned the summiteers against "protectionism, or futile attempts to stem finan-
cial globalisation, or an artificial stimulus of the economy." Tony Barber, Bertrand Be-
noit, & George Parker, Barroso Tells EU Leaders to Avoid Protectionism, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 30, 2008, at 2.
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terparts. If this may be forgivable for the United Kingdom, as an
opt-out State,20 it surely is not for France, Italy, and Germany.
The latter three share the single currency with twelve other
States. They should coordinate economic policies with the rest
of the world acting together with their fellow members of the
Eurozone and following the procedures described in the Treaty
or developed in the so-called Eurogroup (this is the informal
meeting of the Ministers of Finance of the euro area, whose sta-
tus will be officially recognized in an otherwise empty Protocol
attached to the TFEU).21 Of course, prior consultations with the
other euro area members and the ECB take place. Yet, the big
four (three) represent the others and the whole as if they had
been entrusted to do so by the Treaty, which is not the case. On
the contrary, EC Treaty Article 111 (4) calls for Community deci-
sions on the EU's position at an international level, and on its
representation "as regards issues of particular relevance to eco-
nomic and monetary union. 22 The allocation of powers in Arti-
cles 99 (economic union, i.e., prevailing State competences) and
105 (monetary union, i.e., exclusive competences) is to be guid-
ing.2 3
20. See Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, attached to the EC Treaty, adapted without material
amendments by the Reform Treaty.
21. The Protocol on the Eurogroup states that the "Ministers of the Member States
whose currency is the euro" are to meet informally to discuss "questions related to the
specific responsibilities they share with regard to the single currency." The nature of
these responsibilities is not specified. Apart from giving the Commission and the ECB
the right to take part in the Eurogroup's meetings, in divergent wording ("The Com-
mission shall take part in the meetings" versus "The European Central Bank shall be
invited to take part in such meetings"), the Protocol codifies the current practice of the
election of a chairman for the Eurogroup for 2.5 years. Reform Treaty, supra note 7,
Protocol on the Euro Group, O.J. C 306/01, at 153.
22. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 111(4) O.J. C 321 E/37, at 90.
23. Article 111-196 of the European Constitution would have taken over the role of
Article 111(4) of the EC Treaty with a special provision on the euro's place in the
international monetary system. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
art. 111-196, O.J. C 310/1, at 86 (2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]; EC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 111(4), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 90. Similarly, what will be Article
138(4) of the TFEU if the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified will replace Article 111 (4) of the
EC Treaty after ratification of the Reform Treaty. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art.
115c, at 76. The Article forms part of a new chapter 4 of Title VIII on economic and
monetary policy containing "Provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the
euro" and reads as follows:
1. In order to secure the euro's place in the international monetary system,
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision
establishing common positions on matters of particular interest for eco-
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Moreover, even for the United Kingdom, the economic-pol-
icy coordination provisions of the Treaty require it to engage
externally only within the context of a common format with its
fellow EU States and the Commission.2 4 Most markedly, the
Community is not represented as such at the International Mon-
etary Fund ("IMF"). There is close coordination among EU
members of the Fund and the President of the ECB is an ob-
server at IMF meetings. Yet, the bearer of monetary sover-
eignty25 is not itself a member.26 Of course, the existence of con-
stituencies consisting of both EU and non-EU members does
nothing to foster a European representation which, moreover, is
excessive relative to the Union's economic weight compared to
emerging economies. All of this is a rich source for a separate
contribution.
III. ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION: POSSIBILITIES
A. Ways of Improving EU Economic Policy-Making
Recently, I have extensively discussed the details of eco-
nomic policy coordination and the prospects for improvement.
nomic and monetary union within the competent international financial
institutions and conferences. The Council shall act after consulting the
European Central Bank ("ECB").
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt appropriate
measures to ensure unified representation within the international finan-
cial institutions and conferences. The Council shall act after consulting
the European Central Bank.
24. This follows from Articles 98 and 99, for economic policy, and from Article
124(2) for exchange rate policy whereas the coordination of monetary policies is based
on Paragraph 9 of the United Kingdom Opt-out Protocol. See EC Treaty, supra note 2,
arts. 98-99, 124(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 82-83, 101; Reform Treaty, supra note 7, Protocol
on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to
Poland and to the United Kingdom, O.J. C 306/01, at 156 (if the Reform Treaty is
ratified, Articles 98-99 will become Articles 120-21 of the TFEU).
25. The sovereignty issue of sharing the single currency was emphasized recently
by ECB Executive Director jirgen Stark in a speech in Reykjavik (ISL), when he said:
"The fact that a country must first join the EU before it becomes a member of the euro
area is not a coincidence. It is a deliberate approach, which underlines the fact that the
EU is more than a mere economic undertaking. After all, a currency is a key attribute of sover-
eignty. Sharing a common currency implies sharing a common political destiny." Jfirgen Stark,
Member of the Exec. Board of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech Delivered at the Icelandic
Chamber of Commerce: The Adoption of the Euro: Principles, Procedures and Crite-
ria (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/spO80213.en.html
(emphasis added).
26. I have taken issue with this state of affairs in my thesis. See RENt SMITS, THE
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 367-453 (1997).
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The interested reader is referred to these other publications.2 7
They focus on the internal aspect of coordination. There, I have
indicated that the asymmetry in competences between monetary
policy and economic policies has been exacerbated by the (lack
of enforcement) practice and by the recent loosening of the SGP
(2005). Also, I criticized the Treaty's system as "flawed in the
basic structure of EMU, based as it is on the misconception that
enlightened self-interest will ensure coordination of economic
policies and make the participating States put them on a stabil-
ity-oriented footing."28 I have suggested solutions, some already
potentially available under the current Treaty and others which
would have to be based on newly acquired Community compe-
tences. The following paragraphs sum up these ideas.
B. Options Under Present Law29
Among the former class of possible improvements in eco-
nomic policy coordination, I mentioned public adherence to the
principles of economic union by the members of the monetary
union,30 followed up by strict adherence to the relevant rules.
Also, imaginative use may be made of EC Treaty Article 100, the
sole provision which specifically authorizes the Union to adopt
economic policy measures.
C. Options Requiring Treaty Amendments
Further-reaching measures would require Treaty amend-
27. Ren6 Smits, The Impact of EMU Law on National Budgetary Freedom-An Inquiry
into the Limits of State Sovereignty in Economic Policy Matters, in INTERFACE BETWEEN EU LAW
AND NATIONAL LAw 131 (D. Obradovic & N. Lavranos eds., 2007); Ren6 Smits, Some
Reflections on Economic Policy, 34 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 5 (2007).
28. Smits, Some Reflections on Economic Policy, supra note 27, at 14.
29. Included among these options is the idea of agreed overruling, as was the case
with Germany in 2006 when it did not resist being sent a notice pursuant to EC Treaty
Article 104(9), the last step in the excessive deficits procedure before the imposition of
sanctions. Only Germany and Greece have seen this provision applied against them.
Germany could have mustered enough votes of (larger) fellow States to defeat the
Commission's recommendation to this effect, as it did in November 2003 but, this time,
indicated its readiness to be censored.
30. Included among the measures that can be taken in the current Treaty context
is the acceptance by the States of the loss of sovereignty in respect of the size of their
budget deficits, although not of their power to decide on individual budget items. This
acceptance of Union pre-emption of fiscal parameters was put forward by De Neder-
landsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank) President Dr. Wellink in the 2003 Annual Report
of DNB. See DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 1 (2004), http://wwVw.
dnb.nl/dnb/home/file/ar03_tcm47-146939.pdf.
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ments which, unfortunately, neither the European Convention
leading up to the European Constitution nor the Intergovern-
mental Conferences of 2004 and 2007 have been bold enough to
adopt. The increased role for the European Commission in the
multilateral surveillance of economic policies where it may
adopt a warning to a State whose policies are inconsistent with
the economic policy guidelines, 3' and in excessive deficit proce-
dure, where it may likewise itself address an opinion to a State
on the slippery path to fiscal imbalance, 2 -tasks now reserved
for the Council-and the possibility for Eurozone-specific mea-
sures3 3 are hardly steps forward. Options that would require EU
constitutional amendments range from making the Commission
the sole arbiter of budgetary discipline, not allowing States with
an established excessive deficit to vote in the excessive deficit
procedure, and giving the European Parliament a say in the
overall budgetary discipline in the Eurozone.
31. The Reform Treaty art. 99(4) (which would become TFEU Article 121(4), if
ratified) would make the Commission competent to issue a warning to a Member State
whose economic policies are inconsistent with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
("BEPGs") or risk jeopardizing the proper functioning of European Monetary Union
("EMU"), after which the Council can address a recommendation to this Member State,
whereas its predecessor, EC Treaty, Article 99(4) only permits a recommendation by
the Council. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 99(4), 0.J. C 321 E/37, at 831; Reform
Treaty, supra note 7, art. 99(4), 0.J. C 306/1, at 71-72.
32. The Reform Treaty, art. 104(4), supra note 7, 0.J. C 321 E/37, at 71, would
allow the Commission to address an opinion to a Member State with a (threatened)
excessive deficit, whereas EC Treaty Article 104(5) provides that the Commission is to
address such an opinion to the Council which can then take action in the form of a
recommendation. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 104(5), 0.J. C 321 E/37, at 83; Re-
form Treaty, supra note 7, art. 104(5), 0.J. C 306/1, at 72. A Council recommendation
is still the follow-up under the Reform Treaty, with the Council's recommendations
being based on a Commission proposal rather than recommendation (as now under EC
Treaty Article 104(6)) and with further follow-up being sped up ("without undue de-
lay") as introduced in Reform Treaty Article 104(7), which is absent in EC Treaty Arti-
cle 104(7). The European Constitution would have brought the same changes in Arti-
cles III-184(5)-(6). If the Reform Treaty is ratified, this would become Art. 126(6)-(7)
of the TFEU. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 104(6)-(7), 0.J. C 321 E/37, at 83; Draft
Treaty, supra note 21, art. III-184(5)-(6), 0.J. C 310/1, at 79 (2004).
33. The Reform Treaty Article l15a makes the Council competent to adopt, fol-
lowing the procedures of Reform Treaty Articles 99 and 104, measures specific to the
Member States whose currency is the euro in order to strengthen economic-policy coor-
dination and surveillance of budgetary discipline and to adopt euro area-specific BEPGs
which should be compatible with the Union-wide Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 99, 104, O.J. C 306/1 at 71-73 (if the Reform
Treaty is ratified, will become arts. 121 and 126 of the TFEU). Pursuant to its Article III-
194, the European Constitution would have provided the same. See Draft Treaty, supra
note 21, art. 111-194, O.J. C 310/1, at 85 (2004).
1624 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:1614
IV. INDEPENDENCE: LAW
A. Principle
Europe's law on the independence of the central bank is
the strictest set of rules possible. Drawing inspiration from the
template of the Bundesbank, Germany's post-war fiercely inde-
pendent monetary authority, and written with the intention of
fending off intervention into monetary policy by politicians from
Member States with less of a tradition of central bank indepen-
dence, the Treaty and Statute downright prohibit influencing
those entrusted with setting and implementing Europe's mone-
tary policy.3 4 The central banks and the members of their gov-
erning bodies are not only prohibited from seeking or taking
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, Member
State governments "or from any other body," the latter are also
to refrain from "seek[ing] to influence" these members.35 Wider
still, the independence prerogative extends to all tasks and du-
ties exercised by the ECB and the National Central Banks
("NCBs").36 Thus, apart from monetary policy, the other "basic"
34. The ESCB's independence is further guaranteed by the provisions on institu-
tional independence (the independent legal personality for the ECB), on financial in-
dependence (the independent resources of the ESCB outside the EU budget and the
aloof position of the European Court of Auditors in verifying the ECB's books), on
personal independence (the appointment procedures and the guarantee against dis-
missal on policy grounds) and on functional independence (the absence of any re-
quirement to obtain approval for actions or measures beyond the involvement of the
Ecofin Council, the Commission and the European Parliament in the adoption of ena-
bling legislation, discussed below). See ECB Statute, supra note 2, O.J. C 310/225. Also,
the requirement of compatibility of national legislation with central bank indepen-
dence, applicable in all States except the United Kingdom, and counting as a conver-
gence criterion for the adoption of the single currency, serves the ESCB's (for the
NCBs') independence. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 109, 121 (1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at
89, 97; Reform Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 109, 117a, O.J. C 306/1, at 74, 75, 77, 80 (if
the Reform Treaty is ratified, this will become Arts. 131, 140 of the TFEU). Here, only
the main provision on independence is discussed.
35. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 108, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 88.
36. EC Treaty Article 108 reads as follows:
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred
upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a
national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall
seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any
government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community insti-
tutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the deci-
sion-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the per-
formance of their tasks.
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tasks of the ESCB (foreign-exchange operations, foreign reserves
management, payments system oversight)"7 and its other tasks
(the issue of euro banknotes,38 the approval of the volume of the
States' issue of coins," the consultation on draft legislation
within its fields of competence,4 ° the auxiliary tasks in the area of
prudential supervision of banks and financial system stability4"
and the collection of statistics4 2 ) are all free from political influ-
ence. On paper, that is.
B. Interpretation
Before discussing the practice since 1998, when the ESCB
was established, I note that the wording of the Treaty and Statute
leaves room for maneuver. The very same wide scope of the pro-
tection from political influence allows, nay necessitates an inter-
pretation which acknowledges the normal interplay between
elected politicians and appointed central bankers. In a self-pro-
fessed democracy,43 the idea of central bankers not being influ-
enced by Community and State government members is absurd.
The very notion of an adequate economic and monetary policy
mix requires consultations, for which the Treaty provides the
EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 108, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 88; see also ECB Statute, supra note
2, art. 7, O.J. C 310/225, at 227 (having same contents). The Reform Treaty leaves
these provisions untouched. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, O.J. C 306/1. Similarly,
the European Constitution did not amend the provision on independence. See Draft
Treaty, supra note 21, art. 111-188, O.J. C 310/1, at 83 (2004).
37. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87; ECB Statute, supra
note 2, art. 3.1, O.J. C 310/225, at 226.
38. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 106(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 88; ECB Statute,
supra note 2, art. 16, O.J. C 310/225, at 232.
39. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 106(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 88.
40. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(4), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87; ECB Statute,
supra note 2, art. 4, O.J. C 310/225, at 226.
41. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(5), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87; ECB Statute,
supra note 2, art. 25.1, O.J. C 310/225, at 235; see also EC Treaty, supra note 2, art.
105(6), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87 (providing for the potential supervisory task); see also
Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art 105(6), O.J. C 306/1, at 73 (amending the activation
procedure in that the European Parliament's consent will no longer be necessary but
keeping the outdated exclusion of insurance undertakings from any operational tasks
in the area of prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institu-
tions.) If the Reform Treaty is ratified, this will become Article 127(6) of the TFEU.
ECB Statute, supra note 2, art. 25.2, O.J. C 310/225, at 235.
42. ECB Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, O.J. C 310/225, at 226-27.
43. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, O.J. C 321
E/l, at 12 [hereinafter TEU] and Article 2 TEU inserted by the Reform Treaty; see also
Draft Treaty, supra note 21, art. 1-2, O.J. C 310/1, at 11.
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mechanisms. The (Ecofin) Council and the Commission are
present (without a vote, naturally) when monetary policy deci-
sions are taken in the ECB's Governing Board, the ECB Presi-
dent is invited in Ecofin Council sessions devoted to topics "re-
lating to the objectives and tasks of the ESCB," and the ECB
President is to report before (the relevant committee of) the Eu-
ropean Parliament. 44 The Treaty's provisions on mutual consul-
tation provide food for the liberating thought that EC Treaty Ar-
ticle 108 should not be read too literally. This liberal reading is
underpinned by the provisions45 empowering the Ecofin Coun-
cil to adopt rules within which the central bank is to operate
autonomously when conducting certain operations, such as im-
posing reserve requirements, 46 applying sanctions,4 7 acting in a
consultative capacity48 or assembling statistical data.49 The con-
clusion should be that the independence provisions, though very
strictly formulated and written in stone,5 ° leave scope for a pro-
cess of open influencing of the monetary authority, stopping
short of instructions or megaphone diplomacy. Beyond discus-
sions behind closed doors, an open debate is possible between
ECB and its economic policy-makers and lawmakers. Just as the
ECB regularly admonishes the politicians in the area of budget-
44. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 113, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 91; Reform Treaty,
supra note 7, art. 245c, O.J. C 306/1, at 75, 112 (if the Reform Treaty is ratified, will
become Art. 294 of the TFEU); Draft Treaty, supra note 21, art. 111-383, O.J. C 310/1, at
164.
45. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 107(6), 19.2, 34.3, 4, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 45, 50,
55, 88 (minimum reserves, fines and periodic penalty payments, consultation on draft
national legislation in the ECB's fields of competence); ECB Statute, supra note 2, art.
5.4, O.J. C 310/225, at 227 (collection of statistical information); see also ECB Statute,
supra note 2, art. 42, O.J. C 310/225, at 243 (parallel provision to EC Treaty Article
107(6)).
46. See Council Regulation No. 2531/98, 0.J. L 318/1 (1998), amended by 0.J. L
24/1 (2002) (concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central
Bank).
47. See Council Regulation No. 2532/98, O.J. L 318/4 (1998) (concerning the pow-
ers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions).
48. See Council Decision No. 98/415/EC, 0.J. L 189/42 (1998) (consultation of
the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provi-
sions).
49. See Council Regulation No. 2533/98, 0.J. L 318/8 (1998) (concerning the col-
lection of statistical information by the European Central Bank).
50. Meaning that any amendment requires the alteration of the Treaty, which is a
cumbersome procedure and requires the consent of all Member States rather than the
mere involvement of the legislature, as would be the case with amendments of central
bank Acts in other jurisdictions.
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ary restraint, the politicians can express their ideas about the
correct approach to monetary policy and exchange rate policy,
always respecting the independent decision-making of the ECB.
But any formal calls for a specific course of action, the adoption
of a resolution,51 or the exercise of pressure through other
means would be in contravention of EC Treaty Article 108.
C. Externally
Moreover, in the area of external representation and action,
the dividing lines are not as clear as in respect of domestic mon-
etary policy. Thus, as we will see, politicians have focused par-
tially on the exchange rate policy for the euro when trying to
influence the ECB. The EC Treaty draws a distinction between
"formal agreements on an exchange-rate system for the Euro-
pean Currency Unit ("ECU") in relation to non-Community cur-
rencies" which the Ecofin Council can conclude, "after consult-
ing the ECB in an endeavor to reach a consensus consistent with
the objective of price stability," and the absence of any Bretton
Woods-like arrangements. 52 In the latter case, i.e., in a global
system with floating currencies, the Ecofin Council "may formu-
late general orientations for exchange-rate policy in relation to
[non-community currencies] .55 However, the European Coun-
cil, when setting out prior to the beginning of EMU how the
Ecofin Council would make use of its competences, has declared
that, "[w]hile in general exchange rates should be seen as the
outcome of all other economic policies, the Council may, in ex-
ceptional circumstances, for example in the case of a clear mis-
alignment, formulate general orientations for exchange-rate pol-
icy in relation to non-EC currencies." It added that "[t]hese gen-
eral orientations should always respect the independence of the
ESCB and be consistent with the primary objective of the ESCB
to maintain price stability. '54 The quoted passages make clear
51. Submission of a motion for deliberation at the meeting of the Governing
Council is a prerogative of the President of the Ecofin Council and, thus, is within the
scope of permitted influencing. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 113(1), OJ. C 321 E/
37, at 91.
52. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 111(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 89.
53. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 111(1)-(2), OJ. C 321 E/37, at 89-90. If the Re-
form Treaty is ratified, these articles will be included in Article 219 of the TFEU, the
new location of Articles 111(1)-(3), (5). EC Treaty Article 111 (4) would become TFEU
Article 138. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art. 188, O.J. C 306/1 at 99.
54. Resolution of the European Council, of 13 December 1997, on economic pol-
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that the politicians imposed upon themselves restraint in the ex-
ternal area.55 They do not give clear guidance on the precise
demarcation line between what belongs to the ECB and what to
the politicians when it comes to deciding on exchange rate influ-
encing measures. However, it is clear that the ECB has quite
some room for maneuver and may validly say that the politicians
have imposed on themselves a fair measure of self-restraint from
the outset.
V. INDEPENDENCE: PRACTICE
A. Overview
There is no lack of public utterances by economic policy-
makers on their desired outcome of monetary policy decisions.
Sometimes, a State's Minister of Economic Affairs or Finance will
publicly call for a lowering of the ECB's interest rates. At other
times, presidential candidates openly state that the ECB's rule
book should be rewritten if it does not heed popular pressure
for economic stimulation. The same person may also question
whether important decisions of economic policy belong to an
independent institution. In that regard, Nicolas Sarkozy is an
adept of his predecessors. Neither Frangois Mitterand who, de-
fending the Maastricht Treaty in a televised debate in 1992, im-
plied that monetary policy will be set by the politicians and exe-
cuted by the technicians, nor Jacques Chirac who thought that
he could rewrite the Treaty rules on the duration of the appoint-
ment of the first President of the ECB when he sought to see the
Frenchman Jean-Claude Trichet appointed rather than the
Dutchman Wim Duisenberg, seem to have believed in the value
of independent central banks.
B. External Representation Issue
The question whether, externally, the President of the ECB
or the chairman of the Eurogroup is the person to represent the
Eurozone was fought out in public between Jean-Claude Trichet
and Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg's Prime Minister and
chairman of the Eurogroup.
icy coordination in stage 3 of EMU and on Treaty Articles 109 and 109b of the EC
Treaty, O.J. C 35/1 (1998).
55. They also make clear their great caution in the external representation of the
Community after the transfer of monetary sovereignty to EU level.
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In the summer of 2006, the European Finance Ministers
making up the Ecofin Council and the Eurogroup publicly quar-
reled with the ECB about who has primary responsibility for the
euro's exchange rate and about the adequate level of interest
rates in the euro area. The two 'lean-Claudes," Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the ECB, and Jean-Claude Juncker, Chair-
man of the Eurogroup, vied for the title "Mr. Euro." Mr.
Juncker publicly said he had only accepted his reappointment as
Chairman of the Eurogroup, after his fellow Finance Ministers
supported his plan for "intensified dialogue" with the ECB. Mr.
Trichet publicly quoted the EC Treaty's provision which makes it
unlawful to give instructions to, or try to influence, the ECB. He
drew attention to the fact that his signature is on euro bank
notes (and, I should add, that of his predecessor for older bank
notes) . In spite of the ending of the public spat in an appar-
ently conciliatory tone, the argument between the Eurogroup
and the Commission, on the one hand, and the ECB, on the
other, seemed serious enough. Apparently, Mr. Juncker and Ec-
onomic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaqufn Almunia
had written a letter to Mr. Trichet requesting "enhanced dia-
logue."57 As reported in the press, this letter had gone unan-
swered with Mr. Trichet even making clear he had better things
to do than to listen to politicians telling the central bank how to
conduct monetary policy.5"
C. Influencing Interest Rate Decisions
Earlier, Eurozone ministers had publicly called on the ECB
to keep interest rises to a minimum and to be "cautious" not to
harm the economic recovery. The latter was imputed to Ger-
many's Finance Minister Peer Steinbruck.59 As far back as No-
vember 2005, Mr. Juncker had said that it was not essential to
56. See George Parker, ECB Chief Fends Off Politicians'Demands for More Dialogue, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 9, 2006, at 6; George Parker, Call to End Public Currency Squabble,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 11, 2006, at 6.
57. Ralph Atkins & George Parker, Trichet Snubs Calls to Listen to Politicians, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 9, 2006, at 5.
58. Id.
59. See Ralph Atkins & George Parker, Ministers Urge ECB to Limit Rate Rises, FIN.
TIMES (London),June 8, 2006, at 5. Please, note that, on June 8, 2006, the euro/dollar
exchange rate stood at: 1.2735. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 135/1 (2006) (euro ex-
change rates) (as of June 8, 2006). The USD/EUR exchange rate is currently 1.4656.
See Commission Notice, O.J. C 48/5 (2008) (euro exchange rates as of Feb. 8, 2008). It
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raise interest rates as the ECB was then ready to do. "Inflation
indicators are not so worrying as to trigger a monetary policy
reaction," he was quoted as saying before the European Parlia-
ment, while emphasizing the ECB's autonomy in setting interest
rates.6" As this was a statement based on an assessment of eco-
nomic data, issued by the chairperson of the group of Finance
Ministers of the euro area, I consider this a valid exercise of po-
litical influencing by the economic-policy makers, not prohibited
by the Treaty, especially since it acknowledged the monetary au-
thority's independence.
The discussion during the French presidential election cam-
paign focused on the ECB's role in foreign exchange policy, as
well as on interest rate decisions. Already in December 2006,
then Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin called for a clarifica-
tion of roles of the ECB, especially its responsibilities in the area
of foreign exchange policy. He called for better coordination
between the Eurogroup and the ECB.61 Some time before, then
Finance Minister Thierry Breton called upon the ECB not to
raise interest rates further.6 2 Although clearly trying to influ-
ence the ECB's course of action, such statements, when uttered
occasionally, should be considered permissible, although the
lack of coordination with fellow members of the Eurogroup or
the Ecofin Council and the repetition of such statements do not
help to qualify them as normal in the context of discussions
about the appropriate policy mix.
Recently, the debate about the confines of the ECB's inde-
pendence raged again, often fueled by remarks by the French
President. Also after being elected, Nicolas Sarkozy has repeat-
edly called for a reduction of interest rates. He has been quoted
as suggesting in September 2007 that the European Central
Bank should follow the U.S. Federal Reserve by cutting interest
rates, saying, in an interview on French television (TF1 and
France 2 channels), "[w] hen the US central bank lowers its rates,
should be noted that the average exchange rate against a basket of currencies is more
indicative of the euro's strength than the dollar/euro exchange rate.
60. Press Release, European Parliament News Press Service, Juncker: Rate Rise
Not Essential-Alumnia Emphasises Structural Reforms (Nov. 11, 2005).
61. Villepin Wants Clarification of ECB Role, CEN-rRALBANKNEWS.COM, Dec. 12, 2006,
http://wv,.centralbanknews.com.
62. See Roep om matiging rentebeleid ECB [Call For Moderation of ECB's Interest Rate
Policy], HET FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD [THE FINANCIAL DAILY] (Neth.), Nov. 28, 2006.
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everything picks up; when we don't lower ours, we go down,"
adding "I'm telling Mr. Trichet, look at what others are doing. 6 3
In a clear rebuke, Jean-Claude Trichet, during the press confer-
ence of September 6, 2007, said, in answer to a journalist's ques-
tion on European politicians claiming credit for the decision to
hold rates that day, with French President Sarkozy calling the
rate decision small progress and saying that debating about the
ECB can bring about results:
We are independent. We are independent because the
Treaty calls upon us to be independent. By the way, the
Treaty calls upon all executive branches in Europe not to
seek to influence the central bank: Article 108 of the Treaty.
The world over, nobody thinks that we could be influenced.
But those who are claiming that they are influencing us are
placing themselves outside the Maastricht Treaty. And I draw
your attention to the fact that it is very telling to read Article
108 .... And if such calls that are contrary to the provisions
of the Treaty were to have any influence, it would be in the
reverse direction, for obvious reasons. But it is not the case,
precisely because everybody knows that we are fiercely inde-
pendent and that there is not the slightest doubt that we de-
cide in this totally independent way. If we were not deemed
by the market to be totally independent, I draw your atten-
tion to the question of what market interest rates would be
for bonds issued on a 50-year basis. Some governments are
borrowing through 50-year bonds. If the signature of govern-
ment A, B or C was substituted for our own ECB signature as
regards the credibility of the currency, I let you draw your
own conclusions in terms of market interest rates on a 50-year
basis. We are deemed by the market to be able to deliver
price stability during the next 50 years. And it is because we
are deemed to be able to do that that the market interest
rates have a low level taking into account our credibility, this
level of credibility. So thank you again for your question.
6 4
Prior to this press conference, President Trichet had already said
that he was "inflexibly attached to the strict interpretation of the
63. Finfacts Team, Sarkozy Tells ECB to Follow Fed and Cut Rates; Merkel and Thichet
Strongly Defend the Central Bank's Independence, FINFACrs, Sept. 21, 2007, http://www.fin
facts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/articleI0l 11229.shtml.
64. Press Conference, Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the Eur. Cent. Bank, In-
troductory Statement with Q&A (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/
2007/html/is070906.en.html (quote from transcript of the press conference).
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Treaty," referring to EC Treaty Article 108.65
I would prefer a somewhat more flexible interpretation of
EC Treaty Article 108 which allows for politicians' occasional as-
sessment of the monetary policy stance needed, preferably in a
coordinated manner and based on research rather than short-
term electioneering, and provided these utterances do not
amount to an attack on the institution whose mandate is being
undermined. The latter is the case, and EC Treaty Article 108
impinged upon, when these statements are frequent, come just
before and just after the policy-decision making in Frankfurt and
clearly misconstrue the ECB's mandate which is not linked to
employment, as that of the Federal Reserve System in the USA,66
but to price stability only.6 7
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has consistently stepped
in to defend the ECB's independence, both during the French
presidential election campaign and afterwards, even though her
Minister of Finance was among those calling for restraint in re-
spect of interest rate rises in the summer of 2006. Frau Merkel
was quoted as saying, "I will, on behalf of the whole German gov-
ernment, commit myself to the ECB's independence and stop
those who impose their political influence."68 More recently,
65. Trichet: "Inflexibly Attached" to ECB Independence, CENTRALBANKNEWS.COM, Feb. 9,
2007, http://www.centralbanknews.com.
66. The Federal Reserve Act requires the Federal Reserve System to achieve maxi-
mum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.
12 U.S.C.S. §225a (2008) (codifying the Federal Reserve Act, Section 2A).
67. The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing
to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article
2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources,
and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.
EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 105(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 87.
68. See Merkel Defense ECB's Independence, CENTRALBANKNEWS.COM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.centralbanknews.com; Trichet Responds to Sarkozy Criticism, CENTrRALBANK
NEWS.COM, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.centralbanknews.com; Spain's Solbes Supports
Trichet on Sarkozy Debate, CENTRALBANKNEWS.COM, Sept. 28, 2007, http://centralbank
news.com. On July 12, 2007 already, the Financial Times quoted Frau Merkel as saying
when asked on German TV whether she supported calls by the new French President
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France's Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, publicly called
for temporarily higher inflation and higher growth and uttered
the hope that this view would be communicated to the ECB.6 9
(Incidentally, doing so, she not only showed an inclination to
curb the central banks' autonomy and misread its mandate but,
also, appeared to suffer from the same delusion of policy-makers
and media across the Northern Hemisphere who fear a drop in
gross domestic product growth rates or, worse, recession, as if
the levels of output in Europe, the U.S., Japan and Canada were
a reason for deep concern. Growth is crucial for the countries
where billions live in abject poverty and where hunger and cura-
ble disease kill infants and adults without access to adequate
food and medical care. For nations that have long left these con-
ditions behind them, a realistic assessment of the "danger" of
slackening economic growth is long overdue). At about the
same time as Mme Lagarde's interview, calls by President
Sarkozy for a summit of Eurozone leaders were rebuffed by
Chancellor Merkel out of concern for the message such a gather-
ing would send in respect of the ECB, whose independence she
again robustly defended."v
It would be wrong to depict interference as coming from
one Member State only or the discussion being between Ger-
many, supported by the Netherlands, and France, supported by
for a weaker euro, "absolutely not. I would definitively object to this and so would the
entire government." Ralph Atkins & Bertrand Benoit, Merkel Rounds on Paris over Euro
and ECB, FIN. TIMES (London), July 12, 2007, at 6. She was further quoted as follows:
"The population should be protected against inflation. This is very important. That is
why the independence of the European Central Bank is the alpha and omega. And that
is why Germany will not budge on this." Id. Already in January 2007, she said in an
interview with the French newspaper Le Monde that the debate in France about the
strong euro and ECB policies worried her. See Merkel Worried by Debate on ECB Indepen-
dence, CENTRALBANKNEWS.COM, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.centralbanknews.com.
69. On January 9, 2008, she was quoted by Centralbanknews.com as saying in an
interview to the International Herald Tribune on January 7, 2008: "If we have to
choose between high inflation and high growth, or stable inflation and lower growth, I
certainly have a preference for temporarily higher inflation and higher growth", ad-
ding: "I hope this view is shared by some of our European partners and communicated
to the European Central Bank." See France's Lagarde pushes preference for growth,
REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKPAB0371820080
107.
70. "The euro is not a national currency. Its acceptance depends on the assurance
that monetary policy remains independent, which is a completely different situation to
that of the US." Bertrand Benoit, Merkel Reject s Eurozone "Summit", FIN. TIMIES (London),
Jan. 16, 2007, at 7 (quoting Merkel).
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Italy.7 As indicated before, the prospects of interest rate rises
and the perceived threat to Eurozone exports from the rising
euro had given rise to public spats between the Eurogroup and
the ECB in 2005 and 2006. In 2007, the EU managed to get its
act together and sent both men, plus European Commissioner
Joaqufn Almunia, to Beijing to discuss the renminbi exchange
rate.7 2 The discussions on the responsibilities in the area of the
euro's exchange rate are less of a threat to the ECB's indepen-
dence because of the lack of clarity of the Treaty in this respect.
Some posturing may be necessary in order for the right balance
to be struck here.
CONCLUDING REMARKS-INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC
POLICY COOPERATION: PROSPECTS
The legal situation and developments in practice pictured
above show that the strict and widely-drawn legal guarantee of
independence has been adhered to in a less than rigid way by
Europe's politicians. Their inclination to call for interest rate
cuts, or moderation in interest rate hikes, has often taken over
the respect they are due to have for the ECBs' independence.
These instances sometimes were clear violations of EC Treaty Ar-
ticle 108 whilst in less serious cases, they can be said to fall within
the permitted range of influencing of the central bank by policy-
makers. The public statement on the collective assessment of
the dangers of inflation while emphasizing the central bank's au-
tonomy in taking decisions comes to mind as an example of the
latter; repeated public calls for certain behavior by some French
politicians, by a former Italian Prime Minister (for good measure
adding a threat of mandate change) and the insistence that he is
"Mr. Euro" by the Chairman of the Eurogroup ("the otherJean-
71. Then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was quoted to have said on October 27,
2005, after a European Council meeting, that "inflation is not a fear anymore. I talked
about the need to change the ECB's mandate today." Berlusconi Suggests New Mandate for
ECB, CENTRALBANKNEWS.COm, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.centralbanknews.com. Such
an utterance, coming from a Prime Minister and threatening mandate change is clearly
incompatible with EC Treaty Article 108, at least in the absence of manifest errors (on
the side of conservatism) by the ECB when conducting monetary policy. The recent
rise in inflation shows that the brusque statement that inflation is no longer to be
feared was a politician's wishful thought, not a statement based on analysis.
72. See Wolfgang Munchau, Early Steps Towards an Assertive Eurozone, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 19, 2007, at 11 (calling the trip of a Luxembourger, a Spaniard and a
Frenchman to China the first big attempt at high-level macroeconomic dialogue).
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Claude") are clear examples of the former. The lack of preci-
sion in the division of competencies in the external sphere, i.e.,
on exchange rate policy, may explain and even excuse the politi-
cians' overstepping the rigid limits of the wording of EC Treaty
Article 108.
An equally lackluster implementation of the provisions on
economic policy coordination, with an occasional direct flouting
of the rules on national budgetary restraint and less than enthu-
siastic policy coordination in general, aggravates the situation.
With the independence guarantee potentially eroded by a prac-
tice of megaphone diplomacy or audience-driven monetary-pol-
icy "bashing" and the economic policy plank of EMU not being
given its full potential, the EC Treaty's balanced provisions are
being undermined by the States' political actors. The tendency
to act in smaller groups, both internally (the "credit crunch sum-
mit" of the Big Four) and externally (the Big Four's insistence
on taking part in G8 summits and the European reluctance to
accept unified representation at the IMF), exacerbates this. Eu-
rope's single currency and the economic health of the EMU
would be better served by more closely abiding by the rules and
an embracing of the opportunities of monetary union, also on
the economic side. The consistent French calls for economic
governance of the Eurozone may be seen as a veiled attack on
the ECB's independence but it also contains the seeds of better
alignment of policies on the national side of EMU, the suprana-
tional side enjoying single policy-setting for the euro area as a
whole. Only if the States let go of their mutual distrust73 and
egoistic pride, will they be able to reap the full benefits of the
merging of interest and destiny which monetary union entails. A
stronger economic-policy arm of the Union would not have to
undermine the ECB's independence when Eurozone politicians
see their enlightened common interest in a stable monetary en-
vironment in which their joint policy measures may take effect.
This will probably require a further anchoring of stable price
expectations and a build-up of the ECB's reputation for deliver-
ing stable prices and financial stability. Also on the external
side, ajoint representation and common position, truly speaking
73. "It will be a long time before the eurozone manages to represent its interests
effectively. Mistrust, unfortunately, still governs relations among member states, and
between member states and the central bank." Id.
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with one voice, would help Europe make the best of its eco-
nomic power, which the single currency both epitomizes and un-
derpins. This power could be put to good use to tackle the ma-
jor challenges we are all facing, in Europe and beyond, in the
areas of climate change, energy supply and conservation, devel-
opment of the part of the world population living in unaccept-
able circumstances, peace, and coexistence in a global village
with many religions and cultures.
